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Introduction 
Tove Jansson is well known as the author of the Moomintroll books. Over the past decades 
some of the fiction she wrote for adults has at last been translated into English, including a 
number of books of short stories. In the title story of one of these books, ‘Travelling Light’, 
she depicts a man who leaves home for a life of freedom and travel, commencing with a 
cruise but beyond that he has no particular plans. The traveller is single and older, he tidies 
his flat, packs a minimal bag and consciously leaves behind personal items with emotional 
connections, feeling at last liberated from his life. It turns out, despite the small suitcase, 
that his emotional baggage is burdensome and that the dream of travelling light is illusory. 
What he is in fact trying to escape is his own compassion – his ‘dreadful’ empathy for 
others, his need to feel sorry for people, and his desire to rectify their problems and allay 
their anxieties. Leaving his physical home is clearly not an answer to this problem, despite 
his best efforts to remain disinterested. The first stranger he meets, a businessman who is 
unexpectedly sharing the traveller’s cabin and who is suffering countless anxieties about his 
family, reconnects him to his relational and compassionate self. The traveller flees his cabin 
to sleep on the deck, but the next stranger, a woman in search of her son, sees a repeat of 
the cycle, and the story ends with the certainty that the traveller will concretely try to assist 
her. The story supports many meanings, notably, that it is impossible to exist in isolation 
from others or from one’s location. The traveller cannot therefore dis-place himself. It also 
illustrates, perhaps, that in the end, it is impossible to leave home because the home is not 
only our physical location and connections, but also our own interior architecture, our own 
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psychology – home is in this sense who we are. Wherever we are – whether at home or 
elsewhere – we are constantly caught in the tension between home and away, here and 
there, risk and security. 
Each of the stories in Travelling Light tells us something different about the psychological 
and material dimensions of the home and I will refer to them occasionally throughout my 
talk, which has two sections. These sections are more in the nature of loosely connected 
ideas and observations than a coherent set of thoughts or argument. The first part will 
outline scholarly and feminist interest in the idea of home. My focus is on Anglo-centric 
commentary about the home, though this work has been strongly influenced by French 
feminism, and more generally by French phenomenology and psychoanalysis. The second 
part of the paper will consider the idea of home in the political and public domain.  I use the 
Swedish concept of the state as folkhem or people’s home as a point of departure for 
thinking about the much less coherent resonances of home in British and Australian public 
life.  
The Idea of Home 
Home is an evocative and fluid concept which has significance for all people across several 
scales of life: these scales include the self, our relationships and family, our physical resting 
place, our cultures, the nation, and even the planet.  Home is a pervasive concept, 
sometimes so pervasive that we don’t even notice when it is being invoked. Home, 
according to Agnes Heller ‘seems to be one of the very few constants of the human 
condition’ (1995: 2). It is a space, physical or metaphorical, which compresses many 
normative values, as well as the normalities and familiarities associated with family, 
ethnicity, culture and nation. Despite, or perhaps because of, its symbolic and affective 
power, the meaning of ‘home’ is clearly fluid and susceptible to multiple interpretations and 
manifestations (Mallet 2004; Heller 1995). Thinking about the home requires us to cross or 
transcend several dualisms such as those between the individual and the collective; the 
symbolic and material; inner psychological space and the outside world; public and private.  
To take the first of these, the home is an imaginary unique to each of us – even if we share 
the same region, heritage, nationality and even the same dwelling, our home remains 
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distinctly ours because it is a dynamic and subjective relationship with all of these 
networked spaces. It provides our context and place of self-recognition. Home is about our 
own distinctive orientation in different spaces – especially our domestic space, but also 
beyond. As Theano Terkenli states: 
The idea of home is broad and profoundly symbolic, a parameter that infiltrates every 
relationship between humans and the environment as humans reach out to the 
unknown and return to the known. Every activity or experience in which people 
engage to some degree affects their geographical delineation of home (1995: 325). 
The relationships which form a person’s home will often be very complex: when I began 
writing this paper, I was at ‘at home’ in Whitstable, thousands of kilometres from my other 
home in Australia which is, however, only a relatively recent ancestral home for ethnic 
Europeans like myself (and most of the population). Aboriginal Australians, in contrast, are 
already at home, but displaced legally and often physically (Spark 1999: 59; Moreton-
Robinson 2003: 24, 33). 
Home then, is intensely personal and subjective, but it is also a place of collective 
identification: it is intimately bound up with our relations with others, whether these are 
intimate or familial, cultural or regional. Our home is rarely just ours – only in the narrowest 
sense if we live alone do we have an individual home. However, when we move beyond the 
house as the home the collective and abstract aspect of home is unavoidable – the 
experience is something that we share with others as a relationship to a place and the 
people who inhabit it (Terkenli 1995). 
Home is also both symbolic and material in its support for our identities. Iris Marion Young 
explains this in terms of the organisation of space and objects around our bodies and the 
meanings which we attribute to that physical environment. She speaks of two aspects of the 
‘materialization of identity in the home’: 
(1) my belongings are arranged in space as an extension of my bodily habits and as 
support for my routines, and (2) many of the things in the home, as well as the space 
itself, carry sedimented personal meaning as retainers of personal narrative (Young 
2000: 62; see also Bachelard 1994) 
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Although Young is here speaking primarily of the way we organise and attach meaning to 
the things we own and place in our physical dwelling, the idea also passes into the world 
beyond the house. We may have little personal control over the physical things which 
confront us when we leave our house. If we do try to exercise control, this is often 
channelled through bureaucratic processes such as those associated with planning laws, 
though – for better or worse – people often oppose, resist, or ignore such regulations. The 
very existence of planning, heritage and environmental law is recognition of the collective 
value of place.  
Regardless of our comparatively limited ability to shape the physicality of spaces beyond the 
house, we still mentally organise this external world as part of our own history, identity and 
personal narrative: we might attach meanings to particular places – childhood places, sites 
of enjoyment or distress, places we frequent – and we are also shaped by and sometimes 
resist the collective construction of meanings associated with public space. Agnes Heller 
describes this ‘spatial home-experience’ very eloquently in terms of sensual familiarity: the 
sounds, colours and shapes of our everyday environment (Heller 1995: 5). Moreover, we 
develop routines and habits which are distinctly our own. They are all constitutive of our 
home and our sense of identity. Needless to say, these meanings are not uniformly positive, 
but may be painful, conflicting, or the source of great ambivalence. And when read 
affirmatively, as a space of identity, relationality and security, the home – especially when 
linked to a region or nation – is still often defined exclusively, with a rejection of those who 
allegedly do not belong or were not invited.  
The idea of ‘home’ has of course been deeply controversial for feminists. Feminism from the 
1970s to the early 90s was especially critical of the idea of home. The private world of the 
home has often been seen as difficult, dangerous, or at the very least normatively and 
practically problematic. The physical home has been rightly seen as a primary site of 
oppression for many women and a place where inequality is reproduced – the home is 
where women are subjected to the many forms of private power of husbands and fathers 
and where women are expected to perform undervalued and repetitive tasks. Simone de 
Beauvoir, for instance, famously said about housework: 
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Few tasks are more like the torture of Sisyphus than housework, with its endless 
repetition. The clean becomes soiled, the soiled is made clean, over and over, day 
after day. The housewife wears herself out marking time: she makes nothing, simply 
perpetuates the present. (in Young 2000: 60) 
As Iris Marion Young explains by reference to Heidegger, the physically constructive side of 
building the home is coded as men’s work, while the preservation work is women’s work. 
The former supports subjectivity, while the latter supports the subjectivity of others (Young 
2000: 52). Such gendered roles in and around the home are naturalised, meaning that any 
transgression of these roles or resistance to performing them, whether by women or by 
men, can lead to social condemnation.  
Gaston Bachelard turned this view of housework on its head, asking ‘how can housework be 
made into a creative activity?’ He argued that ‘when a poet rubs a piece of furniture … he 
creates a new object; he increases the object’s dignity; he registers this object officially as a 
member of the human household’ (Bachelard 1994: 67). Moreover, the creative and 
constructive role is given explicitly (and somewhat idyllically) to women: 
… housewifely care weaves the ties that unite a very ancient past to the new epoch. 
The housewife awakens furniture that was asleep. 
… A house that shines from the care it receives appears to have been rebuilt from the 
inside; it is as though it were new inside. In the intimate harmony of walls and 
furniture, it may be said that we become conscious of a house that is built by women, 
since men only know how to build a house from the outside (Bachelard 1994: 68). 
Bachelard’s account is fundamentally about making things shiny, and warm: he praises 
waxing and polishing furniture, shining metal objects, and making things glow. Although 
dusting, sweeping, and washing do rate a mention, they are somehow detached from the 
grime, the routine and forced servitude of de Beauvoir’s account. There is no recognition of 
the presence of power in the distribution of roles in Bachelard’s account.  
The constructive aspect to homemaking ultimately resonates with Young’s analysis. 
Although she agrees with de Beauvoir about those aspects of housework which are simply 
drudgery, Young distinguishes mere cleaning from homemaking as a purposive and subject-
building activity: ‘Homemaking consists in the activities of endowing things with living 
meaning, arranging them in space in order to facilitate the life activities of those to whom 
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they belong, and preserving them, along with their meaning’ (Young 2000: 63; cf Swift 
1997). 
For many women, of course, the home is seen to have a positive value associated with 
safety and the development of a secure identity and positive acts of nurturing. But there has 
been much disagreement over whether norms associated with the home are useful in 
describing political space. Feminists have been sceptical of the privilege, nostalgia and 
search for unity associated with these ideas and the separation from other women that they 
entail. Bonnie Honig, for instance, argues that ‘The dream of home is dangerous’ because it 
encourages people to suppress their own differences in a desire for unity, and ‘engenders 
zealotry’. She adds ‘It leads the subject to project its internal differences onto external 
Others and then to rage against them for standing in the way of its dream – both at home 
and elsewhere.’ (Honig 1994: 585).  
Both Rosi Braidotti and Teresa de Lauretis argue that feminists need to leave our 
intellectual, personal, and cultural homes: to live on the margins as eccentric subjects or 
nomads, and reject the ideal of safety which a normative home promises (Braidotti 1994; de 
Lauretis 1990). Braidotti positions feminist identity and epistemology as ‘nomadic’ – never 
at home, always restless, and living on the margins, a position which echoes postmodern 
philosophy’s scepticism about the unified subject. As a result of these and other critiques, 
many feminists have been very ambivalent about using the home or values associated with 
it as a normative basis for feminist politics.  
We can see the risks of an idealised home in another short story by Jansson ‘The Summer 
Child’. Here, a family who lives in the country, and who are rather self-satisfied about their 
healthy and comfortable lifestyle, invite a child from the city in order to share their good 
fortune and the fresh air. The child who arrives, from separated parents, is oppressed by 
global pollution, environmental degradation, starvation, and the waste around him. He 
notices death in the countryside, and rather than being an appreciative addition to their 
home, is a jarring presence who upsets everyone with his difficult questions and unsettling 
behaviour. He brings the ugly world into their wholesome space and although not 
necessarily a likeable child, he casts light on the smugness of this normalised family. Just as 
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‘Travelling Light’ indicates that we can’t simply leave home, ‘The Summer Child’ shows that 
the dream of a perfect home is also illusory and damaging to our identities. 
Some feminists have sought to rehabilitate the normative value of the home, not by 
idealising it, or normalising it as the site of bounded identity, but rather drawing out some 
of its positive tones. Bell hooks, for instance, argued that the home was a site of resistance 
for black women in America. As against the hostility and alien nature of the external world, 
the home is a place of return, identification, and activism. It makes sense, in fact, that – 
given its psycho-political nature – the home should have completely different resonances 
for different groups and individuals. As Weir says:  
In a world where millions of people are homeless, and millions more are refugees or 
immigrants whose displacement  from home has emphatically not been chosen, the 
argument that ‘home’ can be understood only as a mechanism of oppression and 
exclusion can sound vaguely obscene.  (2008: 8; cf Spark 1999: 57) 
It would indeed be very problematic to deny the promise or hope of security and space in 
the form of home to those who have never experienced it. This is underlined by Young’s 
own story about being removed from her home as a child. She argues that home can be 
seen ‘as the material anchor for a sense of agency and fluid identity’ (2000: 70). Young 
proposes four normative values which she says ‘should be thought of as minimally 
accessible to everyone’. These are safety, individuation (or the ability to be oneself in a 
space in relation with others), privacy, and preservation. The value of preservation seems 
especially important to Young, because it values the making and renewal of meanings 
attached to spaces and objects: 
The activities of preservation give some enclosing fabric to this ever-changing subject 
by knitting together today and yesterday, integrating new events and relationships 
into the narrative of a life, the biography of a person, a family, a people. (Young 2000: 
65) 
Some of this knitting of today and yesterday is seen in yet another of Jansson’s stories, 
entitled ‘Shopping’. In this story a city has been devastated by war, earthquake or some 
other natural disaster. A woman whose partner was badly injured in the devastation 
maintains a sense of home by creating connections with their past lives and by normalising 
the horror. For instance, each day she goes out ‘shopping’ at deserted supermarkets which 
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are being similarly raided by other survivors. She tries to make the home ‘cosy and snug’ 
and shuts out the danger by sealing them inside. She does routine tasks like washing up and 
taking out the rubbish. Although the fiction can only be maintained for so long, we see here 
the importance of finding home in places of danger, and normalising the irregular.  
Young and others argue that it is too simplistic simply to reject the ideal of home because it 
represents a safe, privileged and secure identity which is based on exclusion. This is because 
that very security may be a necessary condition or ‘anchor’ to drive an active, fluid, and 
purposeful subjectivity. This observation applies whether we are thinking literally of 
dwelling spaces and ‘rooms of our own’ or intellectual and political spaces. As Sara Ahmed 
and her co-editors in Uprootings/Regroundings suggest, some theory became captive to 
‘presumptions that rootless mobility is the defining feature of contemporary experience and 
that it stands against any form of “rooted belonging”’ (2003a: 2). Since the late 1980s, 
theory has strongly valorised and even ‘romanticised’ fluidity, mobility, flux, dynamism, 
diaspora, and change. As Ahmed et al. point out, ‘Being grounded is not necessarily about 
being fixed: being mobile is not necessarily about being detached’ (2003a: 1). 
Of course, a good home is not necessarily a clearly-bounded and uniformly cosy haven 
where harmony prevails effortlessly. It is a place of negotiation, dialogue, and sometimes 
productive conflict. A home can be ‘provisional or in flux’ and ‘permeable and unstable’ 
(Mallett 2004: 70). Understood in this light, the home is a process constitutive of an 
attachment to place and people, but not simply a defined or stable dwelling or location. For 
this reason, Alison Weir has argued that we can productively use the value of home in a 
public or political context if we maintain an awareness of what others have called the 
dialogic or agonistic nature or political connections. 
In particular our political homes – including our identity politics – might be seen as 
places where we engage in the risk of connection with each other, in the conflictual, 
messy, dangerous, and intimate work of engagement with each other – engagement 
in dialogue, in arguments, in struggles, in openness to vulnerability, to critique and 
self-critique, and to change with a commitment to solidarity with each other that 
mediates our commitment to our shared struggles. (Weir 2008: 8)  
As a political value, home may be a useful concept because it promotes a sense of 
connection, common purpose, and material wellbeing, rather than a normative 
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individualism and competitiveness. At the same time, the process of contestation in 
constructing and maintaining a home must not disappear from view. The feminist 
commentary seeks to transcend the public/private divide in some way by connecting the 
interior psychological world of identity formation with the creation of political spaces. The 
normative layers of the home are a powerful way to do this while challenging a more 
individualist ontology. However, it seems to be yet another imaginative leap into thinking 
about political institutions, and in particular the state, in this way (but see Stivers 2005). 
Home and Public 
The concept of home is therefore intensely personal, but part of the attachment which 
people have to an idea of home is about shared identities and a collective imaginary as a 
people and in some contexts an intellectual and political space. In its uncritical and idealised 
form, it can be a highly problematic concept, which obscures violence and 
disempowerment. But as an aspiration, a site of unique attachment to place, and an 
agonistic process, home may have more promising normative potential – if the critical edge 
of these values can be maintained. But what happens to the home when it becomes part of 
a specifically formal political landscape? In a sense, home is always about the political, 
because it so strongly engenders ideas of place, belonging, and identity which are shared 
with some people and denied to others. Agnes Heller, indeed, wrote of the US constitution 
as a home or place of collective democratic identification for the American people, just as 
the confluence of history, nation, culture, and tradition provides a home for European 
peoples (Heller 1995: 11-14; cf Garcia 2012). ‘Home’ is frequently invoked to refer to the 
nation and a unified national identity, often with a spoken or unspoken division between 
‘us’ and ‘them’. It is political because its resonances, whether to do with public and private, 
construction and preservation, or production and reproduction, are so thoroughly 
gendered. But beyond this material and affective politics, does the home have a more 
concrete political meaning as an explicit image or explanation of the state and government 
as opposed to the nation? Does it have any resonance with the institutionalised or 
constitutionalised aspects of state?  
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Looking at this question from the angle of the history of political ideas, it may appear that 
the ancient distinction between home (or at least household) and state has, over time, been 
overtaken by a modern seepage of certain elements of the domestic into the public sphere 
(as well as the more recent politicisation of the personal within feminist thought). This 
history is diagnosed by Hannah Arendt as a story about the emergence of a social domain 
which crossed the once clear divide between household and city state. In Aristotle, Arendt 
explains, the oikos or household is the domain of necessity and need, while the polis is the 
realm of freedom. The household is a unified realm ruled in a monarchical way by a single 
leader (Aristotle 1962: 37) and is based on inequality (Arendt 1958: 32) while the political 
sphere – consisting as it does of free people (men) is a plurality (Aristotle 1962: 56-57) 
based on equality. The notion of ‘political economy’ – which places the idea of the 
household with its (domestic) economy into the political sphere – was systematised by 
Adam Smith and, according to Arendt, was part of a larger movement in which the concept 
of free action in the public sphere was supplanted by social ‘behaviour’ within mass 
societies (resulting in the systematic accounts of Smith and then Marx). Put simply, ‘mass 
society’ and the ‘social sciences’ with their emphasis on regularised behaviour rather than 
free action were born, and the boundaries between oikos and polis unavoidably blurred 
(Arendt 1958: 42 n35). 
We see the body of peoples and political communities in the image of a family whose 
everyday affairs have to be taken care of by a gigantic, nation-wide administration of 
housekeeping. The scientific thought that corresponds to this development is no 
longer political science but ‘national economy’ or ‘social economy’ … all of which 
indicate a kind of ‘collective housekeeping’; the collective of families economically 
organized into the facsimile of one super-human family is what we call ‘society’, and 
its political form of organization is called ‘nation’. (Arendt 1958: 29) 
Arendt’s point is that the public domain, understood as the site of individual freedom, has 
been taken over by mass society and its preoccupations with production and consumption, 
leaving little space for pure political action and political speech. 
From another political theory angle, however, a different story emerges: the multiple 
referents of the public-private distinction are well known and if Arendt’s modern political 
‘public’ is a shadow of its ancient self, there are other ‘publics’ to take its place. Both 
historians of political thought, and social historians have shown a widening from the 
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seventeenth century to the twentieth of both symbolism and practice in the realms of the 
public and the private. In the seventeenth century it was common for political theorists to 
analogise from the household/family to the state, particularly in defence of the patriarchal 
and absolute authority of the monarch, and the natural state of subjection of citizens to 
kings, and wives and children to husbands (Filmer 1680; cf Butler 1978; Amussen 1988: 54-
58). A more liberal turn of theory, developed by John Locke and others, broke this analogy 
but, ironically, removed for some centuries the question of gender from political theory 
(Butler 1978) while preserving the assumptions of patriarchal thought in the male image of 
the free and equal subject (Brennan and Pateman 1979). Everyday relations between 
women and men no longer informed political theory (for better or worse) and while 
relations between the sexes were perhaps seen as more equal by Locke than by Filmer, 
women were notoriously removed from the political contract and confined to an 
increasingly segregated household domain (Pateman 1988). A strengthening of the, in 
particular middle class, ‘home’ as a sentimentalised and separate realm of attachment (Okin 
1982; Davidoff and Hall 1987: 357-396) only underlined the irrelevance of gender for the 
political. The patriarchal and paternalistic state, with all the resonances of a hierarchical 
family and home, was again theorised by feminists of the 1970s and 1980s. This time the 
family-state connection was analysed in order to uncover and critique concealed power but 
was quickly overtaken by the more postmodern turn of theory which dismantled the unitary 
concept of state and associations with patriarchy (Brown 1992). 
Thus, Arendt analyses the conceptualisation of the nation as a household as a symptom of 
the decline of a true public sphere and the rise of mass society. By contrast, other scholars 
have emphasised the severing of the household-state analogy in political theory and the 
associated rise of the private ‘home’, as the idealised realm of love, normative families, and 
affective relationships. The two narratives appear to conflict, though they are perhaps 
simply different threads in a conceptually pluralistic movement towards modernity. 
Moreover, they are obviously generalisations which are socio-culturally located – as we will 
see, the public-private distinction championed by Locke didn’t open up in Scandinavia in 
quite the same way as it did in the Anglo countries. 
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In this section, I want to tell three further stories about the relationship between the home 
and the state, which are related to these narratives, but not reducible to them. The first 
concerns the Swedish notion of the folkhem or the home of the people, an idea which in 
some ways neatly captures Arendt’s image of the state as a ‘gigantic’ household. The second 
concerns the historical development of the British state as a bureaucratic expansion of the 
monarch’s household. And the third concerns the Australian repudiation of home in the 
state’s constitutional foundations – a repudiation that is, of the fact that the Australian 
continent is comprised of multiple homelands for Aboriginal peoples.  
I make no effort in telling these stories to directly compare the home-state relationship 
between the three contexts – they each have their own specificity and concern different 
aspects of a pluralistic state (ie policy-imaginary, bureaucratic, constitutional) and different 
concepts of home. Each story is, moreover, only a fragment of much larger and more 
complex narratives. The stories are, in a sense, a tryptich in which each of the frames deals 
with a common theme, but which cannot be overlaid or compared – to attempt to do so 
would be highly artificial and reductive, and so I prefer to leave the narratives in their 
inchoate, suggestive, situations. 
Sweden 
The Swedish concept of folkhem, or the state as the home of the people, is the key 
inspiration for this paper, although as much of the extensive literature is in Swedish, I will 
say very little about it. It is more of a jumping off point for thinking about the state in 
relation to the home. I was introduced to the idea of the folkhem when I first visited Sweden 
for the last three months of 2000 and was instantly struck by the image of a political home 
and the principle of solidarity which underlies it. Folkhem has been a core part of social 
democratic politics and welfare state policy in Sweden for 80 years, though its origins are 
much earlier (Hobson and Lindholm 1997: 490). Erik Ringmar describes folkhem as a 
metaphor and a ‘moral project’, which brings together the ideas of family, security, equality, 
and justice: 
The state provided a ‘safety net’ which protected people from the cradle to the grave. 
The metaphor ‘Sweden is a home of the people’ (folkhem), launched by the Social 
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Democrats in the 1930s, captured the idea well. Just like a family, the state cared for 
everyone who lived under its roof and made sure that everyone was properly fed, 
clothed and educated. The folkhem also guaranteed justice and equality: everyone 
should get their ‘fair chance’ and fair chances, it was believed, could only be 
guaranteed by the state. (Ringmar 1998: 48) 
The state as the home of the people has been the central metaphor of the Swedish welfare 
system. The state holds responsibility for sheltering and sustaining the population (Hirdman 
1994: 77; Hobson and Lindholm 1997) and beyond that, tries to embed a material equality 
throughout the labour market and social welfare system (Johansson and Jansson 1998). 
Folkhem is associated with a weaving together of the imagery of the (enlightened) home 
with that of the state and deliberately instrumental efforts to change the fabric of society 
into an egalitarian model (Hirdman 1994). Normatively, the folkhem appears to place 
responsibilities on the state for the material wellbeing of the population rather than assume 
that most things can be taken care of by the economy. It was therefore a decidedly social 
democratic concept which resonates with Young’s emphasis on the home as the place which 
secures the material conditions of identity and political agency.  
Interestingly, in her discussion of the conceptualisation of the polity as a household through 
the notion of social economy, Arendt refers to the economist Gunnar Myrdal, in particular 
his book The Political Element in the Development of Economic Theory [1954]. Alva and 
Gunnar Myrdal were influential in the development of the Swedish welfare state and its 
particular approach to state feminism, its depiction of the polity as a family responsible for 
the care of the citizens, and its quite explicit and radically rationalist social engineering 
(Olsson 1991; Hirdman 1994: 76). Gendered social engineering and in particular creating the 
motivation and support for women to participate equally in the labour market was seen by 
Alva Myrdal in particular as the rational basis for countering population decline (Hirdman 
1994: 83-84). As we have seen, post-Locke, liberal theory strongly differentiated on anti-
patriarchal grounds between the domain of home and family, and that of the state. One 
consequence was a conceptual closure of public political space to women. Gender simply 
became irrelevant in liberal political theory. By contrast, Sweden did not fully differentiate 
between public and private and one consequence of folkhem rhetoric was a space within 
the state for women’s participation – at least after the 1930s. ‘For Swedish feminists in the 
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1930s, the Folkhem was a discursive resource that gave them a certain legitimacy, but also 
allowed them to represent their claims for more participatory citizenship.’ (Hobson and 
Lindholm 1997: 491)   
The folkhem concept has also unsurprisingly been criticised and contested: for instance its 
more general ideology has been associated with the sterilisation project of the 1930s and 
1940s (Runcis 1998). Moreover, according to Yvonne Hirdman, it retained certain gendered 
and heteronormative structures even while outwardly promoting equality (see also 
Johansson and Jansson 1998: 406-409). It was undoubtedly a homogenising and normalising 
force, with the Indigenous Sami people holding no acknowledged status within it, other than 
that accorded equally to all Swedes. Efforts to modernise the concept so that it 
acknowledged multiculturalism and environmental needs were made in the 1990s. 
However, folkhem has also been appropriated very recently for a more conservative, 
nationalistic and xenophobic agenda (Hellström and Nilsson 2010: 62-63) and associated 
with an idealised cultural Swedishness set against a threatening (non-Swedish and migrant) 
other (Norocel 2010: 173-176). These developments are a reminder of the dangers of the 
idealised home and the rhetorical flexibility of the concept: as we have seen, its multiple 
and ill-defined normative contours mean that it is highly contestable in political discourse.  
Britain 
The idea that the state is a home to the people sounds very strange to the liberal ears of 
those of us brought up within an Anglo context, despite widespread pre-liberal theories 
justifying absolute monarchy by reference to family relationships. We are accustomed to 
thinking about the state in corporeal terms, as a body politic – which is no more rational 
than seeing it as a home, though more normalised in the context of Anglo philosophy.  We 
are equally accustomed to generalised talk about home as a geographical region, abstract 
space of identification, or even nation. But the idea that the state is a home or a place of 
personal attachment is not one which is any longer familiar or easy to understand.1 There 
are obvious reasons for this, based in the theoretical developments already mentioned, the 
                                                          
1 This is despite Heller’s compelling analysis of the US constitution as a kind of ‘home’, which is a very 
liberalised and implicit connection. 
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ensuing liberal suspicion of the state, a belief that it is a necessary evil, scepticism about 
governments, and an ingrained individualism which often leads to competition rather than 
solidarity between citizens.  These are generalisations, of course, and can differ widely in 
degree across the Anglo world. 
Is there, nonetheless, any evidence for imagining the political entity through the idea of the 
home? To begin with, and perhaps trivially, we could point to some semantic residues of the 
house (though not necessarily the ‘home’) in British parliamentary and administrative 
terminology: a cabinet is a little cupboard, as well as the inner circle of ministers of the 
state; a house is a dwelling place as well as a legislative assembly; a chamber is a room, in 
particular a bedroom, as well as one arm of a legislative body; privy names a private or 
secret place – in the home a toilet, and in the government an inner council of advisers or 
judges (cf Bryson 2011: 99-100). These references perhaps do not mean much in the present 
context but they are relics of the fact that medieval government in Britain was embedded in 
the monarch’s household and also that the names of the physical spaces of actual houses 
were invested with political meanings (Tout 1920: 71; Elton 1953: 11-12). (On the other 
hand, several once powerful institutions or offices – the wardrobe and the ‘groom of the 
stool’ – moved from a public and administrative to a private significance or complete 
redundancy (Tout 1920; Starkey 2008: 243-244; Elton 1953: 12).)2 The English monarch’s 
intimacies, secrets, and domestic life were once entangled with the political structure, and 
gradual – though not total – segregation has left a semantic mark on the modern state 
structure (a history which it presumably shares with other constitutional monarchies). 
Despite waves of modernisation and reform, the underlying constitutional system arguably 
still owes much to the expansion in powers of one particular household, buttressed by a 
variety of other noble families, all of which continue to be defined by male primogeniture. 
Far from a non-gendered liberalisation of the public sphere, at its heart it retains a 
privileged ‘private’ arena of aristocratic and royal paternalism. Even now, the official 
residences of Prime Ministers and Presidents are often the sites of identification and 
networking for families of leaders across the globe. Such houses and homes in some 
                                                          
2 Tout describes the change of the wardrobe and chamber from being places to being institutions (69). The 
chamber and chamberlain remained institutions of the state, though underwent numerous transitions, while 
the wardrobe contracted. 
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historical and even contemporary sense do represent some merging of home and state. 
However they are not, as in Sweden, homes of the people but rather homes of the elite – if 
there is a coming together of home and state here, it is a decidedly top-down association. 
In addition to physical houses, there are some other reminders of the home-state 
connection in Britain. For instance, the powerful Home Office is a government department 
with a collection of responsibilities now centred on law and order. The terminology which 
associates a government department – and traditionally the most important one – with the 
home feels unfamiliar from the Australian perspective, though there is in Australia a lesser 
known, intermittently named, and more junior ministerial portfolio of ‘Home Affairs’. 
Unsurprisingly, the existence and nature of the British Home Office is above all historical. 
The Home Secretary is, like many aspects of the British state, also essentially a product of 
the monarch’s household: she is the successor of the King or Queen’s secretary, a person 
who, like the privy, was originally concerned with private matters or secrets.  When the 
Home Office was created in 1782 there were just two Secretaries of State, the Home 
Secretary, who was the senior office-holder, and the Foreign Secretary (Troup 1925; 
Newsam 1954). The Home Secretary’s business was essentially all matters of internal 
governance, including that of the colonies (Newsam 1954: 25) and therefore essentially to 
do with domestic affairs. Over the next century the home office and its secretary 
accumulated a fantastic array of responsibilities to do with factories, crime, prisons, 
explosives, mines, rudimentary welfare (poor laws), workers’ compensation, drunkenness, 
cremation and other matters (Troup 1925: 23-24). It is a bizarre and illogical collection of 
responsibilities, which were also gradually removed to other departments as they outgrew 
the scale of one office. As Troup observed, the disconnection between the historical 
responsibilities of the Home Office was (and perhaps still is) explained by the fact that it was 
the default location for any new domestic governmental role (Troup 1925: 24).  
Mid-20th century texts about the Home Office emphasise its role in the maintenance of 
order – it was seen as primarily the guardian of the Queen’s Peace. This was cast in 
classically liberal terms by one permanent secretary, who wrote that its ‘essential task ... is 
to maintain, in a world that seems to pay a diminishing regard to such a principle, the widest 
possible liberty consistent with law and order; and if the Home Office be assailed as an 
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anachronism, the British people stand indicted too’ (Newsam 1954: 18). The current Home 
Office has responsibility for migration and border control, crime, alcohol and drugs, counter-
terrorism, police and, somewhat unfathomably, equality and animal research. It is 
essentially responsible for the maintenance of British order, safety and Britishness. Above 
everything else, the Office promotes itself as responsible for the safety of the public, and in 
this sense it maintains the core principle of earlier times. As Stivers points out in the US 
context, the deployment of home in this sense is hardly reassuring and indeed perverse: 
‘Talk of homeland security makes us feel less at home, not more’ (Stivers 2005: 37). Security 
discourse relies on a fostering of insecurity and suspicion between people, not their 
connectedness. 
It would be stretching things to claim that these various reminders of the home in the 
British state represent any real attachment of the people to the state as a place of shelter, 
protection and identification. These things may be found elsewhere in the public sphere and 
the usual nationalistic evocations of the country or nation as a home abound here as 
elsewhere. The British government has not, to my knowledge, sought to represent the state, 
as opposed to the nation, as the home of the British people. David Cameron came close in 
February 2012 when he spoke of the Union between Scotland and Britain as defining ‘the 
place we call home’ and of the United Kingdom as a ‘warm and stable home’.3 It scarcely 
needs mentioning that a southern Tory and a Nationalist Scot may call a very different place 
‘home’. Under the Labour Government, the Home Office did try to make a direct link 
between its work and physical homes: ‘We want people to feel safe, and confident in their 
homes and neighbourhoods, so they can live freely, contribute to society and prosper in 
their daily lives.’4 The rhetoric under the present government is more severe, focusing on 
security, rather than developing spaces for people to thrive.  Regardless, the Home Office is 
not the home of the British people, even if it sees itself as providing the basic conditions for 
a secure society.  
                                                          
3 David Cameron ‘Scotland Speech’ 16 February 2012: http://www.number10.gov.uk/news/transcript-pm-
scotland-speech/  
4 http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100418065544/http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/about-
us/purpose-and-aims/ 
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The British state does not therefore explicitly seek to represent itself as the people’s home, 
and nor would the people necessarily feel that the state is their home. Certainly there is no 
explicit ideology of this nature as there was in Sweden. Nonetheless, there are both 
symbolic reminders and historical residues of the patriarchal house and home in the state as 
well, of course, as an array of attachments and identifications which connect people and the 
state which reflect some of the values associated with home. We should not therefore be 
too quick to assert that the home is nowhere present in Anglo state thinking. 
Australia 
Nation-building is an ongoing process. It requires constant reinforcement of values and 
identity. It is not sufficient to relegate the failure to respect Indigenous peoples as equals to 
the vagaries of history, because that history constantly informs Australia's identity, values 
and governance. (Dodson and Strelein 2001: 826) 
 
One of Tove Jansson’s most troubling short stories, ‘The Woman Who Borrowed Memories’, 
describes the return of a woman, Stella, to her young-adult home after 15 years away. In 
her apartment, Stella had entertained artistic friends, providing spaghetti and wine to all-
comers, and held regular impromptu parties. She had also included a young office worker, 
Wanda, and allowed her to stay in the apartment, as the housekeeper reports, ‘for ages 
when she couldn’t pay her rent’. When Stella leaves in order to pursue an artistic career, 
Wanda stays in the apartment and is still there when Stella returns. The home has changed, 
because there are no longer any parties and no-one visits the fearful and suspicious Wanda, 
who barricades herself behind safety chains and police locks. More disturbingly, Wanda has 
not only taken over Stella’s home, but has completely revised its history so that it was hers 
all along – in Wanda’s mind, they were her parties, her spaghetti, she made the bookshelf, 
owned the EPs, and shared a special song with the now famous artist Sebastian. She has 
moreover neglected to pass on Stella’s address to him and other friends, and essentially 
taken over Stella’s glittering and care-free past. On hearing Wanda’s revisionist narrative, 
Stella becomes disorientated, feeling suffocated and unwell, because her own past – the 
confluence of place, time and relationships associated with that apartment – is no longer 
her own. When Wanda asks whether she is fearful of being robbed, Stella says ‘I’ve already 
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been robbed’ and leaves prematurely, feeling ‘wildly and inconsolably relieved’ to have 
escaped.  
What happens when your home and your past is stolen from you? What if someone else’s 
identity is actually defined by this theft? There is some resonance here, though not a 
complete analogy, with the Australian state.  
As a provisional statement, it appears that while the state has through much of the 20th 
century been seen as the people’s home in Sweden, it has a more residual, hierarchical and 
elitist presence in the British state – the significance of this in everyday politics is not easy to 
judge and, as I have said, there is no comparison here because the origin and function of the 
home in each case is quite different. In the case of Sweden the home is a homogenising 
metaphor aiming to promote equality and prosperity; in the British case it was once literally 
a home, or at least a household, which has been incrementally transformed into the 
bureaucracy of contemporary government. The white Australian state in contrast is based 
upon the repudiation of home or even a double repudiation of Aboriginal homelands as well 
as, in more recent times and to a limited degree, the British Empire. This latter statement 
may seem controversial, and indeed any repudiation of the British state as the legal ‘home’ 
of the Australia state cannot be dated to a particular moment and remains unfinished: 
Federation was accompanied by strenuous assertions of the non-independence of Australia 
from Britain, and incremental legal developments since that time have never resulted in a 
final, republican, separation. The Queen of the United Kingdom remains the Queen of 
Australia.  
Nonetheless, it is clear that in Australia the state is essentially a historically recent construct 
founded upon a fictitious blank slate, which literally and symbolically extinguishes Aboriginal 
homelands and history while implicitly reaching out to the family of European states (in 
particular Britain) and the actual people who inhabit them. To be more precise, the 
foundation of the Australian colonies first involved a refusal to see that Indigenous people 
already occupied the country as their home, while the subsequent federation of states in 
1901 involved a conscious effort to make Australia a home for white people only, by 
excluding Indigenous peoples from the process and document and by enabling 
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discrimination against other ‘races’. As is well known, the Australian state is built upon the 
fiction of terra nullius, the falsehood that the land was unoccupied or at least not home to 
anybody at the time of settlement. In the words of Aileen Moreton-Robinson:  
the sense of belonging, home and place enjoyed by the non-Indigenous subject – 
colonizer/migrant – is based on the dispossession of the original owners of the land 
and the denial of our rights under international customary law. (2003: 23)  
Of course it isn’t only the sense of home and our belonging which is based on dispossession, 
but the definition of our state, its architecture and its institutions. Without the founding 
dispossession, there could have been no state. The point was underlined by Justice 
Brennan’s (arguably) infamous statement in Mabo (No 2) that the High Court could not 
revise the law in such a way as to ‘fracture the skeleton of principle which gives the body of 
our law its shape and internal consistency’.5 The conquest was an act of state, which cannot 
be questioned. No such respect for principle has ever been accorded to Indigenous law 
(Watson 2009: 35) and, in contrast, we remain quite happy to continue fracturing the shape 
and consistency of Aboriginal peoples, their homelands, and their laws in the name of 
preserving our own. Although the literal truth status of terra nullius has been abandoned 
and a system for recognition of native title set up within the Australian legal system, the 
state itself – its constitutional order, its institutions, etc – repeat that original denial of 
Aboriginal home. It is for this reason, and many others, that Indigenous peoples say they are 
at once at home and displaced in Australia. The Australian state is a denial of homeland, and 
moreover the history of removal and displacement meant a forced migration of Indigenous 
peoples away from their own country but nonetheless across Indigenous space (Moreton-
Robinson 2003: 33; Behrendt 2009). 
Moreton-Robinson describes the specific ontology of Indigenous belonging as the ‘inter-
substantiation of ancestral beings, humans, and land; it is a form of embodiment’ (2003: 
32). Or, in the words of Irene Watson: 
The old people had a deep understanding that while land  is our home, it is our home 
because it is who we are; it is home to our songs and laws that lie in the land; it is our 
relative; it is our grandmother and grandfather. Our ancestors are alive in the land, 
                                                          
5 Mabo v Queensland (No 2) (1992) 175 CLR  1, 16. 
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and this is in accord with saying that to sell the land is akin to selling one’s own 
mother. (Watson 2009: 40) 
Home, identity, country, law, are not differentiated as they are in Western thinking: the 
subject belongs to and (more than that) is a part of the land. In contrast, home under the 
white Australian state is imagined as ownership (involving a subject-object differentiation 
and hierarchy) and – as I have said – in the case of the institutional construction of the state, 
dispossession.  
The establishment of the Australian colonies was, therefore, based upon the non-
recognition of Aboriginal homelands and the perpetuation of the view that there was no 
solid connection between Aboriginal people and the land. The subsequent constitutional 
process consolidated the white European home away from home. The design of the 
Australian constitutional powers relating to race were based on an open strategy of 
reserving the nation for white Australians and the British. As one delegate to the 1897/8 
Constitutional Convention stated, ‘the cry throughout Australia will be [that] our first duty is 
to ourselves, and that we should as far as possible make Australia a home for Australians 
and the British race alone’.6 In this constitutional project, the Indigenous people were 
regarded as less relevant than non-white immigrants, excluded from the count of 
inhabitants used to determine levels of representation, and until 1967 excluded also from 
the federal parliament’s power to legislate ‘for any race’, an exclusion which was not meant 
to provide status to Aboriginal people, but rather to ensure that the states retained power 
over them and could continue their various genocidal policies.7 The ‘race power’ of the 
federal parliament was itself premised on the – at the time obvious to almost everyone – 
desirability of the parliament having the ability to discriminate against all non-white people 
(Williams 2000: 649-650). 
Both constructs – the denial of Aboriginal title and the insistence that Australia was a home 
for white persons only – are embedded in the Australian definition of the state (cf Dodson 
                                                          
6 James Howe, speaking at the Australasian Federation Conference – Third Session, Friday 28 January 1898, 
251, available at 
http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Senate/Research_and_Education/Records_of_the_Australasian_Fe
deral_Conventions_of_the_1890s viewed 28 January 2012. 
7 Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, s 51 (xxvi). 
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and Strelein 2001). The 1967 constitutional amendments, which aimed to equalise the 
status of Indigenous peoples, preserved these basic constitutional foundations. As Dodson 
and Strelein comment: ‘The amendments ... did not recognise Indigenous peoples within the 
Constitution so much as make the text completely silent on the place of Indigenous peoples 
in Australian legal and political structures.’ (2001: 830) The Federal parliament still holds the 
power to discriminate on the basis of race under s 51 (xxvi) though since 1967 the power 
extends to all races and does not exclude Aboriginal people. 
Any critical understanding of the Australian state must therefore be based on the 
recognition that the state is based on a denial of Aboriginal homelands. The state is still 
legitimated by an ongoing refusal to remember the time before the conquest, 
notwithstanding a few mechanisms by which Indigenous laws have been brought into 
mainstream Australian law. The basic structures of the law and the state are founded on a 
foreclosure of Aboriginal pre-existence in the Freudian sense where ‘either the external 
world is not perceived at all, or the perception of it has no effect whatever’ and in which the 
‘ego creates, autocratically, a new external and internal world’ (Freud 1986: 564).  The 
question which remains open is whether there are any prospects for rehabilitating the state-
home connection in non-Indigenous Australia? Are we able to construct a more positive 
home-state imaginary which explicitly recognises the ongoing denial of Aboriginal 
homelands but articulates a responsive, reconstructive, and decolonising position towards 
this history? And could it be done in such a way as to avoid the pitfalls of nostalgia, 
xenophobia, or reinforcing the self-satisfied nature of those who are already empowered? 
Only in recent decades has there been any real attempt to come to terms with this history 
and to base our understanding of the Australian state upon an acknowledgement of prior 
occupation and ongoing custodianship of Aboriginal country. The latest effort is to be found 
in the recently passed Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples’ Recognition Act 2013 
which provides: 
3 Recognition 
 
(1) The Parliament, on behalf of the people of Australia, recognises that the 
continent and the islands now known as Australia were first occupied by 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples.  
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(2) The Parliament, on behalf of the people of Australia, acknowledges the 
continuing relationship of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples with 
their traditional lands and waters. 
 
This provision is part of a temporally-limited legislative, rather than constitutional response: 
in addition to the statement of recognition, it simply provides a process for a review of the 
readiness of the Australian people to support a referendum on constitutional recognition. 
The statute will lapse within two years, and hence cannot be a permanent source of 
recognition. Such provisions do begin a process of legal reconciliation without going so far 
as to state explicitly that the country is the ‘home’ of Indigenous people. Until such time as 
there is a constitutional change which reconstructs the foundation of the state as the home 
of Indigenous Australians, it will clearly be incomplete. 
 
Conclusion 
I have considered only three contexts and the shape and history of each of these is quite 
different to the others. Neither Britain nor Australia has embraced the state-home 
connection in the way that Sweden once did. Nonetheless, and despite liberal efforts to 
maintain the distinction between public and private, the concept of home appears in many 
senses to be inexorable. It emerges in unexpected places, whether that is the bureaucracy, 
the constitution, or a unifying policy, as an element of the construction of the state. There 
are few generalisable normative consequences which can be derived from these 
observations, though, as Heller says, ‘the homes where one really lives and dwells, do 
oblige’ (1995: 18).  
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